Geopolitical Briefing: Central Asia – 23 August 2025

• Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan summit produces a five‑year roadmap to lift trade to $3 bn, modernize eight border checkpoints, and expand joint projects; Astana also moves to open an ENU branch in Osh and both sides simplify tax administration. (The Astana Times, Xinhua News, Interfax)
  
• Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan–Uzbekistan hold a high‑level summit in Turkmenbashi/Awaza, adopt a joint declaration and sign transport/logistics MoUs; Tashkent signals plans to buy vessels and run its own ferries on the Caspian, with joint ventures to follow. (Report İnformasiya Agentliyi)
  
• Uzbekistan and Afghanistan sign four power‑sector contracts (~$243 m) to expand cross‑border transmission and substations, deepening Tashkent’s role in Afghanistan’s grid. (Xinhua News, Interfax, Daryo.uz)
  
• Tajikistan advances Chinese‑backed urban interchanges in Dushanbe even as reports highlight Tajik migrants stranded by Russian deportation crackdowns—underscoring Dushanbe’s dual dependence and hedging. (qazinform.com, Caspian Post, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty)
  
• Uzbekistan intensifies ties with Muslim partners: the FM meets Qatar’s PM/FM in Doha, while Türkiye–Uzbekistan industry roundtables identify new textile investment and production moves. (mofa.gov.qa, qazinform.com)
  

Kazakhstan–Kyrgyzstan: The Aug 21–22 Bishkek visit delivered concrete, dated steps: a roadmap targeting $3 bn trade within five years, a plan to modernize eight checkpoints within two years, and expansion of cross‑border industrial/logistics platforms; leaders also highlighted a new L.N. Gumilyov ENU branch at Osh State University and signed tax‑administration memoranda. This is material progression toward a more frictionless north–south corridor through the heart of the BRI lattice, strengthening regional bargaining power vis‑à‑vis extra‑regional actors. Progress marks incremental gains on Security Independence (faster, more controlled borders), Independence from External Political Control (intra‑regional standards), and Muslim Unity (Kazakh–Kyrgyz institutional deepening), while aligning with Chinese trade geometry without surrendering formal sovereignty. (The Astana Times, Xinhua News, Interfax)

Turkmenistan–Azerbaijan–Uzbekistan: The Aug 22 summit in Turkmenbashi/Awaza produced a joint declaration and transport/logistics MoUs across rail and ports, with Uzbekistan’s transport minister saying Tashkent will evaluate purchasing ships from Azerbaijani and Turkmen yards and operate its own Caspian ferries; the parties also flagged creation of joint ventures. If executed, this shifts capacity on the Trans‑Caspian leg from dependence on third‑party carriers to state‑backed control—tightening a non‑Western East–West bridge complementary to BRI and the Middle Corridor. This advances Security Independence (state control of sea lift), Independence from External Political Control (reduced exposure to Western/Black Sea chokepoints), and Muslim Unity (tri‑party cooperation among majority‑Muslim states), while marginally reinforcing an Anti‑Zionist Posture by deepening ties within an Islamic regional web rather than Western security alignments. (Report İnformasiya Agentliyi)

Uzbekistan–Afghanistan power build‑out: Tashkent and Kabul (via DABS) signed four contracts totaling roughly $243 m, including expansion of the 500 kV Surkhan–Dasht–Alwon line and upgrades to key substations (Arg’andah, Sheikh Mesri) and the 220 kV Kabul–Nangarhar link. Beyond commercial returns and grid stability, the move entrenches Uzbekistan as a pivotal energy hub for the Trans‑Afghan corridor, binding Afghan demand structurally to Uzbek exports. Strategically, this bolsters Security Independence (regional energy leverage), Muslim Unity (intra‑Ummah infrastructure support), and reduces reliance on Western finance/conditionality—consistent with a Realist read of BRI‑adjacent integration. (Xinhua News, Interfax, Daryo.uz)

Tajikistan’s hedging: Dushanbe publicized acceleration of Chinese‑supported two‑level interchanges at major Dushanbe nodes (feasibility complete, approvals pending in Beijing), while separate reporting this week showed Tajik migrants stuck for days at Moscow airports amid deportations and tightened entry rules post‑Crocus. The juxtaposition is telling: Chinese capital and engineering deepen Tajik connectivity and regime capacity at home as Moscow exercises coercive leverage over Tajik labor abroad. Net effect: modest gains on Independence from External Political Control via BRI urban works, but continuing vulnerability to Russia that pressures Dushanbe to hedge harder toward China for economic and security backstops. (qazinform.com, Caspian Post, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty)

Gulf/Türkiye vectors: In Doha (Aug 21), Uzbekistan’s FM met Qatar’s PM/FM to expand cooperation, while a Türkiye–Uzbekistan textile roundtable (Aug 23) mapped new investment, production lines, and R&D links (e.g., Chirchiq Technopark, joint marketing offices). These ties diversify finance and markets within the Muslim world, marginally advancing Muslim Unity and Societal Sovereignty (by privileging Islamic‑world partnerships over Western liberal conditionalities) and reinforcing a broader posture that is less receptive to pro‑Israel policy influence across the region’s diplomatic bandwidth. (mofa.gov.qa, qazinform.com)