Geopolitical Briefing: Sudan – 21 September 2025

• Mass-casualty RSF drone strike on El-Fasher mosque (19 Sep): at least 70–75 worshippers killed near Abu Shouk; among the deadliest single incidents of the siege. (AP News)
  
• UN escalates warnings (20–21 Sep): the Secretary-General is “gravely alarmed,” urges an immediate ceasefire and cites rising risk of ethnically-motivated violence as fighters push deeper into El-Fasher. (United Nations)
  
• UN human rights report (19 Sep): sharp rise in civilian killings in H1-2025, concentrated in Darfur; notes growing use of drones and summary executions. (Reuters)
  
• Humanitarian leadership condemnation (19–21 Sep): the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator and international outlets detail the strike’s location (near Abu Shouk camp) and scale; call to protect civilians and aid access. (ReliefWeb)
  

The mosque strike marks a qualitative escalation in RSF coercive tactics around El-Fasher, targeting a worship space adjacent to a displacement hub (Abu Shouk). Militarily, it reinforces a siege logic aimed at breaking morale and emptying urban sanctuaries; politically, it heightens costs for any state seen as enabling RSF logistics—aligning with assessments that UAE-linked gold/route leverage over RSF is central—even as Abu Dhabi denies complicity. For Egypt, which backs SAF and prioritises Nile-corridor stability, the incident underscores the necessity of preserving a unified command capable of securing Darfur’s arterial routes. The attack therefore narrows room for U.S.–Saudi mediation unless it yields verifiable civilian-protection measures around markets, hospitals and mosques. (AP News)

The Secretary-General’s statements (20–21 Sep) elevate El-Fasher from a humanitarian crisis to a potential mass-atrocity flashpoint, warning of ethnic violence as frontlines shift inside the city. This places sharper scrutiny on external arbiters—Washington, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Cairo—to move from declaratory roadmaps to operational de-escalation: monitored no-strike zones, secure aid corridors, and restraints on drone/artillery use. For Sudan’s sovereignty, the utility of outside pressure will be judged solely by its ability to deter RSF siege tactics while not diluting the state’s chain of command under SAF—Cairo’s long-standing preference. (United Nations)

The OHCHR report quantifying a surge in civilian killings (H1-2025) and documenting drone use in dense areas provides evidentiary ballast for targeted sanctions or arms-flow interdictions—tools already signalled by Council actions this month. It also clarifies tactical trends: RSF reliance on UAVs around El-Fasher and displacement camps, and patterns of summary executions. Strategically, such documentation reduces deniability for external suppliers and strengthens legal and diplomatic avenues Sudan and partners (notably Egypt and, conditionally, the U.S./Saudi in the Quad) can use to constrain RSF resupply. (Reuters)

Humanitarian leaders’ Port Sudan appeals following the strike—pinpointing the impact on Abu Shouk—tighten pressure for guaranteed access. Absent credible security guarantees, famine-and-disease as instruments of war persist, degrading the state’s capacity and deepening societal fracture. For Russia, whose Red Sea access ambitions hinge on a stabilised eastern corridor, the week’s events again show that any port arrangements are brittle without pacifying the Darfur hinterland; for Saudi Arabia and the U.S., the credibility of the Jeddah/Quad track now rests on delivering observable protection for civilians within days, not weeks. (ReliefWeb)