Iran Weekly Report – 12 October 2025

Geopolitical Briefing: Iran — INSTC & Chabahar: Logistics, Sanctions, and Eurasian Leverage — 27 Sept 2025

  • Rasht–Astara push: Tehran formally transfers a key land strip to Russia to accelerate the North–South rail link closing Iran’s Caspian gap. (EADaily)
  • Chabahar crunch: Washington’s waiver for India’s 10-year Chabahar deal is set to lapse on 29 Sept, forcing New Delhi into a sanctions–strategy choice. (The Economic Times)
  • Corridor volumes rising: Russian and Iranian officials tout steady growth on INSTC branches, targeting multi-million-ton flows over the next 3–4 years. (Interfax)
  • Caspian constraints: Falling water levels and port limitations complicate the maritime leg, nudging freight toward Iran’s rail build-out. (jamestown.org)
  • Energy & India linkages: As India seeks relief to buy Iranian crude amid tariff pressure on Russian oil, Tehran’s port and corridor leverage grows. (The Times of India)

1) Rasht–Astara push: Iran hands land to Russia to close the rail gap

Iran has transferred a 34-km land strip to Russia for the Rasht–Astara railway, the missing segment that unlocks continuous rail from Russia through Iran to the Gulf/Indian Ocean. Moscow and Tehran have held multiple work sessions this month to keep timelines tight. Once operational, the link reduces dependence on sanction-exposed sea lanes and reinforces Iran’s role as the indispensable Eurasian hinge between the Caspian and the Arabian Sea. (EADaily)

2) Chabahar crunch: waiver expiry forces India’s choice

India’s May 2024/2025 10-year operating pact at Chabahar (Shahid Beheshti)—including $120m capex and a $250m credit line—now collides with Washington’s decision to revoke the Chabahar carve-out on 29 Sept. New Delhi just routed fresh Afghan aid via the port, signaling intent to keep the corridor alive, but Indian entities face U.S. penalties if the waiver lapses. For Tehran, the timing is an opportunity: either India defies U.S. pressure and deepens east-facing integration through Iran, or it blinks—ceding ground to China and Russia in Iran’s ports. (WorldECR)

3) Corridor volumes rising despite sanctions

Russian and Iranian statements through Aug–Sept highlight sustained growth on the INSTC—notably the eastern branch (Russia–Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran)—with officials projecting up to ~15 mt within 3–4 years as new track and terminals come online. Interfax reporting references additional 2025 increases and Iranian demand for Russian grain, paper, and oil products via the corridor. The message: even under Western pressure, traffic is re-routing through Iran, shifting the center of gravity of Eurasian logistics away from U.S.-policed choke points. (RUSSIA'S PIVOT TO ASIA)

4) Caspian constraints are real—favoring rail build-out

Analysts warn that Caspian Sea level decline is reducing vessel draft, trimming cargo loads and complicating year-round reliability for the sea leg of the INSTC. That environmental drag, combined with higher insurance and interdiction risks in Western-patrolled waters, strengthens Tehran’s rationale for accelerating Rasht–Astara and complementary inland links (Rasht–Bandar Abbas, Chabahar–Zahedan–Zahedan–Sarakh’s). The more Iran internalizes the corridor onto rail, the less exposed it is to Western leverage at sea. (jamestown.org)

5) Energy leverage with India: ports, corridors, and crude

New Delhi, now facing 25% penal tariffs on Russian barrels, has asked Washington to green-light Iranian oil to diversify supply. If granted—or if India proceeds through creative settlement—Chabahar and the rail/road spines through Iran become even more strategic to India’s energy security. Tehran can trade long-term oil offtake and corridor access for rupee/rial settlement, investment into Iranian rails, and expanded Indian presence at the port—deepening Iran’s integration with a major Sunni-majority partner while eroding U.S. leverage. (The Times of India)

Analyst’s take: The corridor geometry tilts in Iran’s favor when sanctions and maritime fragility rise. Closing Rasht–Astara and locking in India at Chabahar tighten Iran’s control over east–west and north–south flows, reduce Western coercive reach, and build Muslim-world economic linkages—while constraining Israel’s ambition to redirect trade via alternatives that bypass Iran.

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