Geopolitical Briefing: North Africa – 12 October 2025

• Algeria unveils a $60 bn energy plan (2025–2029) centred on upstream gas/oil and hydrogen. (Reuters)
  
• Egypt secures an S&P sovereign upgrade to ‘B’ and posts a narrower current-account deficit. (Reuters)
  
• Global Sumud flotilla: detainees released/deported; Tunisian participants arrive home; new first-person accounts emerge. (Anadolu Ajansı)
  
• Western Sahara: quiet last-mile diplomacy ahead of the late-October UNSC mandate renewal. (Africa Intelligence)
  
• Libya: Eni resumes offshore drilling after five-year hiatus, signalling cautious upstream re-engagement. (Reuters)
  

Algeria’s $60 bn energy surge
 Algiers’ five-year program directs ~80% to upstream while advancing 3.2 GW of renewables and flaring cuts. This materially strengthens Security Independence (supply, revenues) and Independence from External Political Control (diversified buyers/tech partners), while giving Algiers added leverage versus Morocco in Maghreb energy diplomacy. No direct movement on Muslim Unity or Societal Sovereignty; Anti-Zionist Posture is unchanged. Delivery risks remain—project execution, service-company capacity, and EU demand elasticity. (Reuters)

Egypt’s macro breathing space
 S&P’s upgrade and the Q2 FY25 current-account improvement expand Cairo’s policy room just as Red Sea dynamics are in flux, modestly improving financing costs and shoring up Security Independence (budget for defense/energy imports). The rating action also reinforces Independence from External Political Control by broadening market access—yet reliance on Gulf/IFIs and imported Israeli gas remains a structural constraint. Watch shipping-route reopen expectations (freight markets are already pricing scenarios) for upside to Suez tolls. (Reuters)

Flotilla aftermath—pressure without escalation
 Within days of Israel’s high-seas interdictions, foreign detainees were released and deported; Tunisian participants returned to public receptions in Tunis, and first-person accounts surfaced. Regionally, this sustains societal Anti-Zionist Posture and bottom-up mobilisation while allowing North African governments to avoid formal escalation with Western partners—minimising costs to migration/energy cooperation. It does not alter military balances but raises political costs for future interdictions near EU approaches. (Anadolu Ajansı)

Western Sahara—UN corridor narrows
 Africa-Intelligence reports intensified under-the-radar exchanges before the late-October MINURSO vote, while Security Council watchers flag a tense but low-intensity status quo on the ground. For Rabat (aligned with the U.S./Abraham Accords), any mandate tweak nearer “autonomy” would consolidate external cover; for Algiers/Polisario, lawfare in Europe and diplomatic counter-moves remain the main levers. Net effect: incremental contest over Independence from External Political Control via mandate language and recognition politics; other metrics largely static. (Africa Intelligence)

Libya—measured upstream restart
 Eni’s return to offshore drilling after five years signals gradual risk acceptance despite western-Libya tensions. If sustained, this bolsters Security Independence (revenues, power balance) for Tripoli-aligned institutions, though exposure to militia shocks and governance fragmentation persists. International re-entry also nudges Independence from External Political Control by widening partner options beyond crisis-management aid. (Reuters)