Geopolitical Briefing: Sub-Saharan Africa – 12 October 2025

• Cameroon votes in a high-stakes presidential election likely to extend Paul Biya’s 43-year rule, amid separatist conflict and jihadist threats. (Reuters)
• DRC publicly rebukes the EU’s minerals deal with Rwanda, calling it a “double standard” as Brussels courts Kigali despite UN findings on M23 support. (Reuters)
• Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of “actively preparing for war”, elevating border-state tensions and prompting competing diplomatic messages to the UN. (The Africa Report)
• World Bank lifts Sub-Saharan Africa growth outlook to 3.8% for 2025, citing easing inflation—while warning on debt and job creation. (Reuters)
• Tanzania opens treason trial of opposition leader Tundu Lissu weeks before a national vote, intensifying scrutiny of political freedoms. (Reuters)

Cameroon’s election—stability at the price of sovereignty pluralism.
 Voting today is widely expected to preserve Biya’s incumbency thanks to state-institutional control and a fragmented opposition. For our measures, Security Independence remains strained by dual insurgencies (Anglophone west; Far North jihadists), while the consolidation of executive power advances regime Political Sovereignty but narrows broader societal sovereignty. Regionally, a prolonged status quo could slow Regional Integration (e.g., corridor security) and keep Yaoundé reliant on external security partners—at odds with the pivot away from Western leverage. Anti-Zionist posture is not materially engaged in this case. (Reuters)

DRC vs EU-Rwanda minerals pact—resource sovereignty meets geoeconomics.
 Kinshasa’s public challenge to Brussels over its Rwanda minerals MoU heightens a contest over who sets the rules of critical-minerals trade from the Great Lakes. It directly touches Regaining Control Over Natural Resources and Independence from External Political Control, as Congolese authorities seek to curb flows they argue are laundered via Rwanda and linked to M23. The move also aligns with a wider non-aligned narrative against perceived neocolonialism, nudging partnerships toward alternative patrons if EU conditionality hardens. Implementation will hinge on verification regimes and whether the nascent U.S./Qatar peace track can meaningfully de-risk supply routes. (Reuters)

Ethiopia–Eritrea tensions—escalation risks without force-structure relief.
 Addis Ababa’s letter alleging Eritrean war preparations (and Eritrea’s denials) signals a dangerous drift that could reopen a northern front just as Ethiopia struggles with internal stabilisation. A relapse would undermine Security Independence and divert fiscal space, weakening Political Sovereignty over economic priorities. It would also complicate Regional Integration (Red Sea access diplomacy; Horn trade). No clear Muslim Unity vector is activated beyond cross-border communal ties; Anti-Zionist posture is again tangential. Watch for UN or AU de-escalation channels and whether third-party mediators (including Gulf actors) exert leverage. (The Africa Report)

Macro tailwinds with structural caveats.
 The World Bank’s upgrade (3.8% in 2025) reflects easing inflation and FX stabilisation, potentially enlarging policy room for African governments to finance local value-add in minerals and energy—supporting Resource Control and Sovereignty agendas. But elevated debt service costs and weak job growth threaten social buy-in, limiting states’ capacity to resist external conditionality. Without faster intra-African trade execution (AfCFTA, corridors), the positive cycle may stall before it reinforces Security Independence through stable revenues. (Reuters)

Tanzania’s treason trial—signals on political sovereignty and external alignment.
 Trying Tundu Lissu weeks before elections projects regime control over the political arena. Short-term, it consolidates Political Sovereignty in a narrow sense but risks reputational costs with Western partners and rights groups—potentially accelerating a hedge toward non-Western patrons consistent with assumption (d). Domestically, constricting civic space can weaken social cohesion needed for Internal Security and economic reform. (Reuters)