Geopolitical Briefing: Syria — 14 August 2025
- Türkiye and Syria signed a defence cooperation MoU in Ankara (13 Aug), with Ankara publicly backing Damascus and warning Israel and the SDF against destabilisation. (Reuters, AP News, Daily Sabah)
- Damascus cancelled participation in Paris talks with the SDF (9 Aug); tensions escalated as clashes near Aleppo killed a Syrian soldier (12 Aug). (Reuters, Al Jazeera)
- Syria, the US and Jordan held a follow‑up meeting in Amman (12 Aug) to work toward a durable truce after the Sweida bloodletting and to scope reconstruction support. (AP News, Al Jazeera)
- An explosion was reported inside Idlib city today; authorities are probing the cause amid persistent insecurity in HTS‑held areas. (Reuters)
- The SDF reported foiling an infiltration attack in Deir ez‑Zor’s Jazrat (8 Aug), highlighting the east’s simmering insurgent threat and contested river crossings. (sdf-press.com, North press agency | وكالة نورث برس)
Türkiye’s defence ministry said on 13 August that Ankara and Damascus signed a memorandum on “military training and advisory cooperation,” with Turkish officials adding today that Türkiye will provide weapons systems, logistics and—if required—troop training. At a joint presser, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan castigated both Israel and the US‑backed SDF for undermining Syria’s stability, and framed the new accord as a step toward supporting Syria’s territorial integrity and curbing separatism. For Damascus, the MoU locks in overt Turkish patronage and military know‑how at a moment of internal flux; for Ankara, it institutionalises leverage over northern frontlines and SDF‑held zones without a costly ground escalation. This deepens state‑to‑state alignment with Türkiye and strengthens central command over security instruments, while constraining both Kurdish autonomy projects and Israeli room for coercive diplomacy in the north. (Reuters, AP News, Daily Sabah)
On 9 August, state media announced Damascus would not attend French‑hosted talks with the SDF after a Kurdish‑led forum called for revisions to the transitional charter—moves the government branded a blow to ongoing integration efforts. The decision immediately bled into the security file: before dawn on 12 August, the defence ministry said SDF units attempted to infiltrate positions in Tal Ma‘az east of Aleppo, triggering clashes that left one Syrian soldier dead; independent wires and regional outlets carried matching details. Politically, pulling out of Paris stalls a pathway to institutional unity and keeps rival command chains alive; militarily, the Aleppo contact underscores the risks of de‑confliction breakdowns along mixed lines of control. The week’s sequence hardens Damascus’ autonomy from external conveners and tightens the centre’s claim to a national monopoly on force, though heavy‑handed tactics against Kurdish entities risk alienating constituencies whose cooperation is needed for national cohesion and for reducing avenues of Israeli influence via proxy politics. (Reuters, Al Jazeera, The National, شفق نيوز)
A second track ran through Amman on 12 August, where Syria, the United States and Jordan said they would work toward a lasting truce following the July carnage in Sweida and explore parameters for reconstruction support. Reporting indicates the agenda included protection for minority communities and steps to keep border smuggling and cross‑border raids contained; separate regional coverage described the same meeting as supportive of consolidating the ceasefire in the Druze‑majority south. For Damascus, this preserves channels with Washington and Amman while keeping the locus of talks in a neighbour capital rather than a Western one; for Jordan, it links border security to de‑escalation in southern Syria; for the US, it anchors a minimalist stabilisation posture. If sustained, this process improves Damascus’ control over internal security in the south and marginally reduces the scope for Israeli unilateralism along the frontier, while also aligning with popular demands for protection of civilians in majority‑Druze districts. (AP News, Al Jazeera)
Inside Idlib city this morning, an explosion was reported with official media saying authorities were still verifying the nature of the blast. Whether the incident proves to be an IED, a targeted killing or accidental detonation, it illustrates the continued fragility of governance under Hay’at Tahrir al‑Sham and the ease with which spoilers can puncture the calm in densely populated opposition areas. For Damascus, instability west of the M5 sustains the case for incremental normalisation with Türkiye to manage the contact line; for Ankara, it justifies deeper involvement on security coordination. In aggregate, such incidents underscore the limitations of non‑state control and the need for integrated policing and justice—developments that would consolidate central authority and crowd out external exploitation of Idlib’s security vacuum. (Reuters)
In the east, the SDF said it thwarted an attempted riverine infiltration at Al‑Jazrat (Deir ez‑Zor) on 8 August, exchanging fire after attackers crossed the Euphrates by boat and fired an RPG; local independent outlets carried the same account and imagery. No SDF casualties were reported. The episode fits a pattern of low‑intensity attacks and counter‑attacks around oil‑route nodes and ferry points, where armed cells, regime‑aligned auxiliaries and tribal networks compete over taxation and access. For Damascus, keeping such incidents contained—preferably via negotiated de‑confliction and the re‑opening of integration talks on its terms—would extend central oversight over strategic waterways and energy corridors, while diminishing the utility of foreign sponsors and denying Israel pretexts to intervene east of the river on the counter‑terrorism alibi. (sdf-press.com, North press agency | وكالة نورث برس)
Overall this week’s moves—formal security alignment with Türkiye, the Paris pull‑out paired with Aleppo clashes, the Amman track on the south, and renewed Idlib and Euphrates‑valley flashpoints—tilt the balance toward consolidated command under Damascus with Turkish backing, away from decentralising experiments that multiply armed authorities, and toward diplomatic arrangements that limit external veto players—including Israel—over Syria’s internal security settings. (Reuters, AP News)
