Geopolitical Briefing: Türkiye

— 24 August 2025

• 23 Aug: Ankara terminated the crisis‑era FX‑protected lira deposit scheme (KKM), closing the door to new entries and renewals as part of a shift back to orthodox policy. (Reuters, Bloomberg)
  
• 21 Aug: Turkish port authorities tightened rules on Israel‑linked shipping, demanding declarations of non‑linkage and expanding docking bans in practice. (Reuters)
  
• 23 Aug: First Lady Emine Erdoğan publicly urged Melania Trump to pressure Israel over Gaza’s children, sharpening Ankara’s leadership bid within the Muslim world. (Reuters, Al Jazeera)
  
• 21 Aug: The Defence Ministry announced technical teams will travel to Syria to scope training/consultancy needs under the new military cooperation track. (Anadolu Ajansı, Hürriyet Daily News)
  
• 20–21 Aug: Ankara restated that any Ukraine peacekeeping requires a ceasefire framework; President Erdoğan spoke with Vladimir Putin to push a political track. (Reuters, US News)
  

Ankara’s 23 August decision to end the KKM—halting all new accounts and renewals—is the clearest rollback of heterodox crisis management since 2021. The scheme’s fiscal exposure and currency‑option features were a structural constraint on policy autonomy; its removal reduces contingent liabilities, re‑anchors price discovery in the interbank market, and raises the credibility premium on the Central Bank’s rate‑setting and liquidity tools. For external partners, the shift improves sovereign risk pricing and makes lira settlements in cross‑border logistics and energy contracts less dependent on ad hoc guarantees. The move will tighten domestic financial conditions in the short term, but it frees Ankara to negotiate trade, energy and defence deals without the constant drag of a quasi‑fiscal currency put. In geopolitical terms, a cleaner monetary stance strengthens Türkiye’s bid to be an East–West payments and logistics hub less vulnerable to dollar‑denominated shocks and external vetoes, thereby widening space for independent diplomacy and reducing leverage from pro‑Western financial centres. These adjustments cumulatively expand economic sovereignty, increase political autonomy from outside pressure, and bolster Ankara’s ability to shape regional trade routes on its own terms. (Reuters, Bloomberg)

On 21 August, port masters across Türkiye began informally requiring agents to certify that ships are not Israel‑linked and are not carrying military or hazardous cargo bound for Israel; Turkish‑flagged vessels are barred from Israeli calls, and ships to/from Israeli ports face docking denials. Operationally, this weaponises port governance to constrain Israel’s maritime throughput at a time when Red Sea disruptions already inflate logistics costs. Politically, it signals to Arab and wider Global South partners that Ankara is prepared to translate condemnation of Israel’s expansionism into concrete chokepoint management along Mediterranean lanes it influences. The measure complements last year’s trade cut‑off, channels cargo toward alternative Turkey‑centred corridors, and raises the cost of sustaining Israel’s war economy. It also strengthens Ankara’s convening power among Muslim economies seeking to re‑route supply chains away from Israeli ports. Taken together, this week’s maritime practice dilutes Zionist leverage in regional trade, nudges Muslim partners toward Turkish‑coordinated alternatives, and underscores Ankara’s control over critical geography in service of its wider security and economic aims. (Reuters)

The messaging front moved in lockstep with logistics. On 23 August, Emine Erdoğan published an open appeal to Melania Trump, contrasting Washington’s performative concern elsewhere with the documented famine conditions in Gaza and urging direct pressure on Israel’s leadership. Ankara’s use of the First Lady platform is strategic: it internationalises responsibility for Gaza’s children, reframes the debate around humanitarian law rather than Israeli threat narratives, and builds a moral coalition across capitals that are otherwise reluctant to cross Washington. The communication synchronises with Türkiye’s port restrictions and prior trade severance, forming a consistent diplomatic‑economic pressure architecture rather than episodic condemnations. For the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation network, it offers political cover for further collective action—legal petitions, trade boycotts, or transit restrictions—while keeping Ankara at the centre of coordination. The week’s rhetoric therefore advances Islamic solidarity, undermines the legitimacy of Israel’s expansionist programme, and contributes to a climate in which pro‑Israel influence is costlier to sustain across media, legal and commercial arenas. (Reuters, Al Jazeera)

In the northern Levant, the Defence Ministry confirmed on 21 August that technical delegations will shortly travel to Syria to review defence needs, plan training and consultancy, and accelerate the restructuring of the Syrian Armed Forces under the new Türkiye–Syria cooperation track. This moves the 13 Aug MoU from paper to practice—standardising doctrine, logistics and command‑and‑control in ways that entrench Ankara’s influence inside Syria’s defence institutions over the long term. Turkish readouts emphasised the principle of “One State, One Army,” a direct challenge to the YPG/SDF’s paramilitary autonomy and the grey‑zone economies that have sustained it. Early implementation—training modules, study visits, and technical support—also creates a platform to shape border security, customs revenue capture on M4/M5 arteries, and discipline the patronage networks that once enabled Kurdish separatist actors to operate. By exporting institutional capacity rather than episodic raids, Ankara gains leverage over Syria’s internal security architecture while cultivating a Muslim neighbour’s alignment on transit, energy and counter‑terrorism. The week’s steps deepen integration with a Muslim state, reinforce control over the Kurdish security file, and expand Türkiye’s autonomous role in re‑ordering Levantine power balances. (Anadolu Ajansı, Hürriyet Daily News)

On 21 August, Turkish officials reiterated that any peacekeeping construct for Ukraine presupposes a ceasefire and security guarantees framework; the previous day, President Erdoğan’s call with Vladimir Putin kept open the high‑level channel Ankara uses to mediate corridor, grain, and maritime risk arrangements. The sequencing is deliberate: by refusing troop deployments absent a ceasefire, Ankara avoids entanglement, preserves its Black Sea balancing act, and maintains credibility with both Kyiv and Moscow as an indispensable broker rather than a subordinate to NATO hard‑liners. It also signals to European and Gulf partners that Türkiye’s value lies in de‑confliction architecture—straits access, insurance norms, naval signalling—rather than token force contributions that might compromise its mediator brand. The stance thus elevates Turkish diplomatic autonomy, protects domestic security bandwidth for its counter‑separatist priorities, and keeps its logistics corridors central to any eventual settlement. In practical effect, this week’s diplomacy widens political independence from great‑power pressure while safeguarding the maritime and trade ecosystem that anchors Türkiye’s rise as a regional power. (US News, Reuters)