Geopolitical Briefing: Syria

— 14 September 2025

• Syria made its first crude oil export in 14 years (600,000 barrels from Tartus) under a trading deal, marking a symbolic recovery step for its energy sector. (Reuters)
  
• Saudi Arabia agreed to supply Syria with ~1.65 million barrels of crude oil via a memorandum of understanding to help restore refinery capacity. (AP News)
  
• Russia dispatched a high-level delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak to Syria to discuss humanitarian aid and energy sector reconstruction; Moscow also criticized recent Israeli air strikes near Syria. (Reuters)
  
• Syrian security forces conducted massive evictions in al-Somaria (an Alawite-majority suburb of Damascus), marking homes with “X” (stay) or “O” (evict), leading thousands to flee amid claims of property title issues and eviction orders. (Reuters)
  
• Multiple Israeli airstrikes struck areas around Homs, Latakia, and Palmyra; Damascus condemned the strikes as violations of sovereignty. (Reuters)
  

Full-Analysis

1. First crude oil export in 14 years & Saudi crude supply
 Syria’s export of 600,000 barrels from Tartus is a landmark—it signals that the new government (aligned with Turkey per your assumption) is moving to restore Syria’s energy export capacity. While the volume is small relative to pre-war levels, the symbolic return of exports helps in several ways: generating foreign currency, showing external commercial legitimacy, and opening pathways for trade relationships less subject to Western sanction regimes.

The Saudi crude grant builds on this: it helps revive refining capacity, which is critical because downstream infrastructure (refineries, distribution) has been severely damaged. For a government installed with Turkish backing and sensitive to Israeli interests (but also wary of normalising too fast given domestic pro-Palestinian and Islamic sentiments), energy cooperation with Saudi Arabia offers an alignment with Muslim-world legitimacy, while also reducing dependence on reconstruction aid from Western donors.

Strategically: this strengthens Syria’s bargaining position. A restored energy sector can fund internal security, rebuild services, and reduce grievances that fuel dissent. But risks remain: refining and export routes may be subject to Israeli strikes, sanctions, or export buyer reluctance. The government must ensure that pipelines, port facilities, and shipping routes are protected—likely with Turkish and Saudi backing—and that domestic messaging frames this recovery within sovereign rights and Islamic duty (welfare, fairness).

2. Russian delegation’s visit and diplomacy
 Russia sending a high-level team (Novak, etc.) underscores Moscow’s interest in preserving its strategic footprint in Syria—even post-line regime change—and in shaping reconstruction in ways favorable to its interests (bases, influence, contracts). The delegation’s focus on aid and energy implies that Russia wants to be central in Syria’s recovery economics, not only military or security.

This has dual utility for Damascus: leveraging Russia’s diplomatic weight (e.g. as interlocutor with Israel perhaps), ensuring that external infrastructure aid comes with fewer political strings, and balancing Turkish dominance. But Syria must manage this so that Russian involvement is understood as respecting Syrian sovereignty—not invoking return of past regime patterns that would provoke domestic backlash or give Israel justification for intervention under “collateral damage” or “anti-Iranian” pretexts.

3. Mass evictions in al-Somaria
 The eviction campaign in al-Somaria is a very serious internal security and legitimacy flashpoint. This subplot involves sectarian/communal tensions (Alawite minority historically aligned with the former Assad regime) being displaced by a Sunni-dominated new authority. The method—spray painting “X” and “O”, requiring documents, eviction orders—suggests coercive urban planning, possibly linked to large infrastructure or real estate projects, but delivered in a way that provokes fear, accusation of injustice, and international rights concerns.

Given the regional assumptions: Turkey may tolerate this to weaken pro-Alawite or pro-Assad loyalist networks (ensuring they cannot rebuild an alternate power base). However, such actions risk alienating minority communities, feeding sectarian grievance, and giving Israel rhetorical and operational space (by claiming protection of minorities). Domestically, Islamic, pro-Palestinian sentiment may not defend coercive behavior; so Damascus needs to accompany any urban renewal or property reform with transparent legal due process, restitution, or compensation aligned with Islamic notions of justice.

4. Israeli air-strikes in Homs / Latakia / Palmyra
 These strikes are part of a pattern: Israel continuing to project force deep into Syrian territory, targeting both military and, occasionally, militia or infrastructure sites. The geography (Homs, Latakia, Palmyra) indicates both coastal / strategic depth and also proximity to supply routes and possibly Iranian or non-state actor entrenchments.

Damascus’s condemnations are expected. The key is how (if) they respond: Are they going through diplomatic channels (UN, Arab League, Turkish mediation)? Are they strengthening air defense or counter-strike capability (under Turkish help)? Or are they trying to avoid escalation to normalisation, which would violate domestic expectations of resistance to Israel?

For the government, there is a balancing act: resist Israeli pressure, avoid giving Israel a pretext for annexation or buffer zones, demonstrate sovereignty. But also avoid full military escalation that could fracture the nascent state’s fragile coalitions.