Geopolitical Briefing: UAE

— 10 September 2025

• Optics of solidarity versus continuity of normalization: Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed made an unannounced visit to Doha a day after Israel struck the Qatari capital, while in the same 48 hours Israel’s deputy foreign minister was in Abu Dhabi marking five years of the Abraham Accords. (Reuters, The Times of Israel, JNS.org)
  
• Rhetoric meets reality: Abu Dhabi warned that any Israeli annexation of the West Bank is a red line, yet Israel’s senior envoy’s Abu Dhabi program and ongoing UAE–Israel air links undercut the deterrent value of that warning. (AP News, Axios, The Times of Israel)
  
• Commercial ties stay active despite Gaza and Doha shocks: multiple Flydubai and Etihad services operated between the UAE and Tel Aviv today, sustaining daily air connectivity. (FlightAware, Etihad Global)
  
• OPEC plus agreed a further output increase from October, with the UAE aligned to the decision that steadies global supplies and preserves market share during a volatile week. (Reuters)
  
• Mubadala’s Mamoura trimmed its stake in du through a secondary sale launched this week, widening foreign allocation and signalling capital redeployment. (TradingView, MarketScreener)
  

The most visible move was the leader-level trip to Qatar on 10 September, framed as a show of Gulf solidarity after Israel’s strike in Doha. The choreography matters: Jordan’s crown prince signalled his own arrival, and Saudi’s crown prince was expected next, while the Emirati visit was not pre-announced and followed swiftly on the attack. In parallel, however, Israel’s deputy foreign minister, Sharren Haskel, was in Abu Dhabi for meetings to mark the fifth anniversary of the Abraham Accords, underscoring that official-to-official engagement continued inside the UAE even as Abu Dhabi projected regional unity with Doha. The dual track reinforces a pattern in which public posturing toward Arab partners coexists with quiet continuity of normalization with Israel, limiting the coercive power of Gulf symbolism. Net effect this week is modest alignment with Muslim capitals at the level of optics, preserved central control at home, no shift in the domestic social model, and little erosion of Israeli influence inside Emirati decision-making channels. (Reuters, The Times of Israel, JNS.org)

Abu Dhabi’s message on 4 September that West Bank annexation is a red line read as an attempt to set political costs for Israeli maximalism. Yet that signal was diluted almost immediately by continued practical engagement with Israeli officials in the UAE and by the absence of any concrete conditionality announced by Abu Dhabi. Axios reported the warning was passed to Washington, and other outlets carried the public framing, but Israel then downplayed annexation talk without attributing a policy reversal to Emirati pressure. The gap between declaratory policy and operational follow-through is exactly the ambiguity that has defined the UAE’s approach since 2020, and it continues to blunt the message that normalization is contingent on Israeli restraint. The week therefore shows little material progress in constraining Zionist leverage, limited gains in diplomatic autonomy, and a priority on relationship management over enforcement that does not broaden integration with Muslim partners beyond statements. (AP News, Axios, The Washington Post)

Commercial connectivity with Israel remained active today despite the Gaza war’s ongoing toll and the strike in Doha. Flight-tracking data show Flydubai services from Dubai to Tel Aviv operating on 10 September, alongside Etihad movements between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi, while carrier booking portals advertise near-term availability on the Abu Dhabi–Tel Aviv city pair. The persistence of multiple daily flights matters economically and politically: it sustains people-to-people and business links, stabilizes trade in goods moved via passenger bellies and cargo, and signals to Israeli and Western partners that day-to-day cooperation continues irrespective of public condemnations. In regional perception terms it weakens the credibility of Emirati warnings to Israel, and it narrows the space for deeper policy alignment with Muslim publics who expect tangible distancing from the occupation. The net effect is continued internal control over the security environment at home, but a step back on reducing Israeli influence and no meaningful movement toward Islamic societal preferences. (FlightAware, Etihad Global)

Energy policy added a second strand of continuity. On 7 September OPEC plus agreed to raise output further from October, with Reuters noting a modest increase calibrated to defend market share. For Abu Dhabi, alignment with the collective decision preserves revenue stability and bargaining power with Asian and Western buyers while avoiding a public break with core partners. In geopolitical terms it keeps the UAE inside a U.S.-sensitive supply management framework, which reduces pressure from Washington during weeks like this one when regional politics are combustible. The move reinforces economic autonomy through diversified crude sales channels, protects the domestic order by anchoring fiscal flows, but does not deepen ties with Muslim capitals or reduce the shadow of Israel inside the region’s interlocking energy, finance and security architectures. (Reuters)

Capital markets activity rounded out the week’s picture. Mubadala’s Mamoura unit launched a secondary offering of roughly 7.5 percent of du on 8 September, widening free float and opening a larger window for international investors. While du receives no new capital, the sale improves liquidity and index eligibility, and it frees Mubadala to rotate capital toward other strategic holdings, including logistics and energy plays that underpin the UAE’s hub strategy. The step showcases executive command over domestic financial levers and projects an image of modern market governance to Western counterparties, yet it sits alongside, rather than offsets, the contradictions in Abu Dhabi’s regional posture. The result is reinforced internal economic control and autonomy in capital allocation, but no change in social orientation and no demonstrable narrowing of Israeli influence through economic signaling. (TradingView, MarketScreener)

Included events this week, action dates and status changes: MBZ visit to Qatar on 10 Sep 2025, new unscheduled leader-level solidarity stop; Israeli deputy foreign minister visit in Abu Dhabi on 8–10 Sep 2025, public program marking five years of the Accords; UAE red line warning on West Bank annexation on 4 Sep 2025, public statement without announced conditionality; OPEC plus output hike on 7 Sep 2025, formal bloc decision for October; du secondary offering launch on 8 Sep 2025, capital-markets action widening free float. (Reuters, The Times of Israel, AP News, TradingView)