Geopolitical Briefing: Somalia — 21 September 2025

Summary (new items from 14–21 Sep 2025)

• Mogadishu protests over alleged land grabs and forced evictions (Sep 21). Large demonstrations reported in Daynile/Hodan; grievances target federal and municipal authorities over due-process violations in evictions. (Somali Guardian)
  
• Opening of Parliament session delayed again (Sep 20). Reports say the 7th session was pushed amid fears of heckling during the president’s address; opposition tensions remain elevated. (Somali Guardian)
  
• Government reaffirms e-Visa enforcement (Sep 19). Authorities insist no entry without online visa/eTAS following the Sep 1 rollout, including for Somali dual-passport holders; diaspora pushback noted. (allAfrica.com)
  
• AFRICOM strikes face domestic scrutiny (Sep 18). Somali authorities probing claims a village elder was wrongly killed in recent U.S. strike; AFRICOM confirms multiple Sept 9–13 strikes coordinated with FGS. (Stars and Stripes)
  
• Press-freedom incidents (Sep 20). SJS alleges a Mogadishu journalist was threatened and coerced into apologising to NISA; separate legal threats reported against two Puntland journalists. (Horn Observer)
  

Analysis aligned with strategic assumptions

a) Restoration of sovereignty & territorial integrity.
 The Mogadishu eviction protests highlight the governance cost of coercive urban land actions without transparent adjudication and resettlement. If unmanaged, they risk fusing socio-economic grievances with political opposition, complicating capital-area control and diverting security bandwidth. Re-establishing due-process (land courts, compensation frameworks) is essential to turn enforcement into state-building rather than backlash. The parliament delay signals fraying elite consensus around constitutional/electoral tracks and increases the chance of procedural workarounds that weaken institutional legitimacy. (Somali Guardian)

b) Control over maritime resources & strategic waters.
 The e-Visa/eTAS enforcement is a step toward hardening gateway control (APIS/PNR compliance, watch-list checks) across airports and by extension seaports. Friction with diaspora travellers is a political tax, but if paired with service reliability and exemptions guidance, the system can tighten border integrity critical to future offshore licensing, fisheries monitoring and port security. Early messaging and grievance-handling will determine whether this becomes a sovereignty win or reputational drag. (allAfrica.com)

c) Balancing Gulf rivalries & foreign military presence.
 AFRICOM’s Sep 9–13 strikes underline continued reliance on U.S. enablers. The civilian-harm probe is a pivotal test: if FGS leads transparently—publishing findings, offering redress—it can retain U.S. support while asserting agency, preserving room to balance other partners (Türkiye, Gulf, China). Mishandling would fuel anti-foreign narratives and complicate coalition cohesion against al-Shabaab/ISIS-Somalia. (Stars and Stripes)

d) Stabilising security through indigenous forces.
 Capital-area protests and press-freedom incidents point to a non-kinetic security gap: social control measures that erode public trust. Coercive handling of journalists or protesters tends to hand al-Shabaab propaganda oxygen and weakens intelligence cooperation that SNA/police depend on for urban threat-reduction. Short-term: designate a civilian lead for eviction dispute resolution; publish SOPs limiting force in crowd control; and formalise media-engagement protocols to reduce security-service overreach. (Horn Observer)

e) Regional influence via the Horn & IGAD.
 Parliamentary gridlock and domestic rights complaints blunt Somalia’s diplomatic pitch in IGAD forums exactly when Mogadishu seeks backing on border issues and Red Sea security. Conversely, successful e-Visa normalisation (with transit facilitation for regional officials and aid workers) can improve Somalia’s case as a responsible custodian of regional mobility and counter-terror vetting. (allAfrica.com)